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WORKER LEARNING AND
COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS
W. KIP VISCUSI and MICHAEL J. MOORE*

The authors hypothesize that in industries with relatively high levels
of job-related injury risk, workers with longer job tenure will more
clearly appreciate the degree of job risk than will newly hired workers,
and will thus be more willing to accept lower wages in return for higher
workers' compensation benefits. This hypothesis is confirmed by an
analysis of quit behavior using 1981-83 data from the Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics and 1981-85 data from the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.

the standard compensating wage
differential model, workers value their
wage and workers' compensation components based on full job risk information.
Market forces generate positive wage
differentials as ex ante compensation for
exposure to relatively high risk. Similarly,
market forces generate wage offsets for
the increases in ex post risk compensation
embodied in workers' compensation benefits.
These predictions can be modified to
take into account potential imperfections
in worker information, as in Viscusi
(1979a,b, 1980a,b,d), where the role of
learning is incorporated into the worker's
decision model. The potential for learning
about risks introduces a new market
N

* W. Kip Viscusi is George G. Allen Professor of
Economics, Department of Economics, and Michael
J. Moore is Associate Professor of Economics, Fuqua
School of Business, Duke University. The first
author's research was supported by the endowment
of the George G. Allen chair at Duke University, and
the second author's research received partial support
from the Business Associates Fund at the Fuqua
School of Business.
The data and programs used in this study are
available on request to Michael J. Moore, Fuqua
School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC

27706.

response through worker quitting after
the acquisition of adverse risk information. In a full information world, after
controlling for health status, no unexpected job risk-quit relationship will be
observed. In the more realistic sequential
decision model in which there is an
opportunity for learning, the acquisition
of adverse new information by the worker
on the job may lead the worker to quit.
With the exception of the experimental
results reported in Viscusi and O'Connor
(1984), in which worker responses to
alternative chemical labels were monitored, tests of the standard compensating
differential model and of the learning
models have been distinct, as each focuses
on a different aspect of labor market
behavior. The empirical evidence supporting compensating risk differentials is
substantial: greater job risks boost worker
wages, and workers are willing to accept a
wage cut in return for higher workers'
compensation benefits.' These results are
1See, for example, Smith (1979) and Viscusi
(1979a) for analysis of wage-risk tradeoffs. Estimates
of wage-workers' compensation tradeoffs appear in
Arnould and Nichols (1983), Butler (1983), Dorsey
and Walzer (1983), and Viscusi and Moore (1987). In
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JOB TENURE AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
the main predictions of the standard
compensating differential theory, and
they continue to hold if learning is
introduced. Market tests of the role of
worker learning, on the other hand, have
focused on two other empirical issues-the
effect of injury experiences on workers'
risk perceptions and the positive
effect of
2
job risks on worker quitting.
The focus of this paper is broader than
that of separate analyses of the wage and
quit effects of job risks because we use the
relationships typically estimated and tested
in the standard compensating differential
theory to examine the job risk-learning
model as well. In particular, using a large
data set on workers in the early 1980s, we
evaluate the tradeoffs between wages and
workers' compensation benefits and between wages and risks implied by worker
quit behavior, and compare these tradeoffs
across worker tenure groups.
Younger workers will assess job risk less
precisely than more senior workers, since
their informational base for making these
judgments is smaller. In multi-period
models that incorporate learning and
experimentation with risky jobs, workers'
reservation wage rates will be less for jobs
posing less precisely understood risks, for
any given mean level of risk. The empirical prediction is that more senior workers
will demand greater compensation for risk
because of their more precise judgments.
In addition, workers who are on the quit
margin (those who would need only a
small inducement to quit their jobs) will
have greater subjective risk perceptions
than other workers. These workers consequently will demand greater wage compensation for higher risk levels, since they
will be comprised disproportionately of
workers whose risk beliefs have been
adversely affected by on-the-job experiences. These workers will also assess a
greater chance of receiving workers' compensation benefits, so their expected value
Moore and Viscusi (1990) we provide a literature
review of estimates of the effects of fatality risks and
workers' compensation on wages.
2 See Viscusi (1979a,b, 1980a,b,d, and 1983) and
Viscusi and O'Connor (1984).

of higher benefits will be greater. We
therefore expect to observe greater wagerisk and wage-workers' compensation
tradeoffs for these workers.
Theoretical Framework
The learning model that we apply here
to the wage-workers' compensation tradeoff was first introduced in Viscusi (1979a,b,
1980a,b,d).3 Our overall objective is to explore the relationships between the wagerisk tradeoff and the wage-workers' compensation tradeoff for new workers and for
senior workers on the quit-no quit margin.
The essential ideas can be captured in a
two-period model. Let there be two health
states: healthy and injured. In the good
health state the worker receives a wage
rate w, from which he derives utility Ul(w).
In the injured state the worker receives
workers' compensation benefits b, where w
- b. This assumption reflects the structure
of workers' compensation programs in
virtually every state, since benefits are
typically two-thirds of the wage or less,
except for workers with very low wages.
We assume that the worker would rather
be healthy than not (that is, U5 (x) > O(x)),
has a higher marginal utility of income
when healthy (U. > U2), and is either
risk-averse or risk-neutral (U., U= - 0).
The worker values payoffs over time using
a discount factor 3 that equals the reciprocal of 1 plus the interest rate.
Suppose that there are two possible jobs,
a risky job and a safe job. We can assume
with no loss of generality that the safe job
poses no risk of injury. 4 The safe job
offers a payoff w 0 forever. The risky job
offers the worker an initial perceived
probability of not being injured equal to p
and a 1 -p chance of suffering an injury
that lasts a single period. If the worker is
not injured in period 1, he revises his
3 A variant of this analysis without learning
appears in Diamond (1977).
One could adopt the assumption that the
alternative job poses a known risk of injury without
altering the model structure, even in the n-period
case. If both jobs are uncertain and there are more
than two periods, the model structure becomes more
complex. See Viscusi (1979a) for these extensions.
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assessed probability of not being injured
upward to p'. If he is injured, the
assessed probability is p-. It is also
possible, as noted by Viscusi (1979a), that
workers revise their expectations based on
observations of other workers' injury
experiences. The revision of workers'
probabilistic beliefs follows a standard
Bayesian learning process, where
(1)

p+ >p>p-.

The workers' initial job decision involves
a choice between two periods of work on
the safe job or initial work on the risky job,
after which he can quit if he is injured in
period 1. As first noted by Viscusi (1979a),
the worker's problem mirrors the classic
two-armed bandit problem, which describes the optimal sequence of plays on
two slot machines. On one machine the
probability of success is known, and on the
other it is uncertain. Thus, a payoff on the
uncertain machine yields information in
addition to monetary rewards. For this
class of two-armed bandit problems, it is
shown in Viscusi (1979a,b, 1980a,b,d) that
the stay-on-a-winner rule is always optimal. The worker will not leave the risky
job after a favorable experience in period
1. The worker also will not leave the safe
job once he starts on it.
The wage package for the marginal new
worker attracted to the firm must satisfy
the condition that expected lifetime utility,
V, is equal between the two jobs, given the
opportunity the worker has to switch from
the risky job following an unfavorable
period 1 outcome:
(2)

V = U(wO) (1 +3)
= pUl(w) + (l-p)U 2 (b)
+ 3p[p+Ui(w) +
(I -p +)U2(b)]
+ 3(1-p)Max[Ul(wo),
p-U'(w) + (1-p-)U2(b)].

(3)

V = 0 = pU'(w) + (1 -p)U 2(b)
+ 3pip[+ul(w) +
(I -p +)U2(b)]
+ 13(1 -p)Max[0,p2
+ (1-p-)U
(b)].

Not all workers will quit their jobs prior
to period 2 after an unfavorable period 1
job experience. The focus here, however, is
on the wage-benefit tradeoff of the marginal senior worker relative to the pay package that will attract the worker to the job
initially. The marginal senior worker will
quit after an adverse experience in period
1, so the wage package (wb) sufficient to
attract the worker initially must satisfy
(4)

2 (b)
V = 0 = pU'(w) + (1-p)U
+ 13Pip+Ui(w) +
(I -p +)U2(b)],

since the last term in equation 3 equals zero
after an unfavorable period 1 experience.
The first issue analyzed is the wageworkers' compensation tradeoff that will
be reflected in the (w,b) package for new
hires. Implicit differentiation of equation
3 yields

(5)
Ow

-

Ob

V

-U

b

2

V.

[(l-p) + 13p(1-p+)]
U.1P + I3pp+]

The value of Ow/Ob represents the wage
offset in response to b for the new hire in a
two-period job choice problem. The initial
wage package (w,b) will be adequate to
retain the worker if his on-the-job experiences are favorable.
The worker on the margin at the start of
period 2 has an expected utility Z equal to
(6) Z = 0 = p-gU(w) + (l-p-)U 2 (b),
since he is indifferent between leaving
(where U'(wo) = 0) and staying on the
risky job. The wage-workers' compensation tradeoff for this worker equals
(7)

If we set Ul(wo) equal to zero, with no loss
of generality, we have

U(w)

Ow
8b

-(12-p)U

-Zb
-

Z

-

p-U 1

One issue that we investigate empirically

HeinOnline -- 45 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 82 1991-1992

JOB TENURE AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
is the relative magnitude of the wageworkers' compensation tradeoffs in equations 5 and 7. Workers who have experienced or observed an on-the-job injury
should value workers' compensation more
highly, since they will assess a higher
probability of receiving such benefits
than will other workers. For workers with
an adverse job experience, the expected
amount of workers' compensation benefits will be (1 -p+)b. For new hires who
plan to quit if their initial period job
experience is unfavorable, the discounted
expected benefit amount is (1 -p)b +
13(1 -p)(1 -p-)b, where these benefits are
provided over (1 -p) + 13(1 -p) periods.
The lower expected amount of benefits
per period of work for new hires is
reflected in a lower expected utility as
well, which will influence the compensating differential they are willing to accept
for these benefits. In particular, one
would expect
New
Hire
Tradeoff

Quit
Margin
Tradeoff

(w

- Zb

(8)- 8b "Z

- vb

vw'

w

(1-)U
p
2

-U2[(1-p)

+ 13p(l-p+)]

ui'[p + 13pp+]

After some algebraic manipulation, equation 9 reduces to
(10)

p

<p+.

Given the restrictions on probabilities
outlined in equation 1 above, equation 10
always holds.
The second empirical concern will be
the effect of worker learning on the
character of the wage premiums commanded by job risks. From the development above, equation 4 implies that, for
new hires,

(11)
ul(w)

-(1

-p)U 2(b) - 3p(l -p+)U(b)
p (1+13p+ )

Similarly, solving for Ul(w) from equation
6 for workers on the quit margin yields
the condition that
(12)

U(w)

-(1-p

)U2 (b)

p-

The utility metric defined by setting
Ul(wo) equal to zero leads to a negative
value of U2(b), implying that the right
sides of equations 11 and 12 are positive.
The condition that must be met for the
risk premium required by senior workers
on the margin to be higher than that of
new hires is that U(w) be greater for this
group. Thus, the right side of equation 12
must exceed the expression on the right
side of equation 11. This requirement is
always satisfied if inequality 10 holds, as is
assumed.
In addition to compensation for risk, the
overall wage structure of the firm will, of
course, also include returns to worker experience and performance. This wage structure can be viewed as defining the pecuniary returns to the worker over time. As is
standard in agency theory models of wages,
it is the new hires and other workers on the
margin of leaving the firm who are of greatest concern. By altering the entering wage
level, the firm ensures a flow of new workers to the firm. Higher wages also diminish
the tendency to quit, but since quitters tend
to be workers with particularly adverse job
experiences, learning-induced quits will
continue to occur. Because of the difference in risk perceptions of the potential
quitters, both safety and workers' compensation should be more highly valued by this
group than by the new worker group, which
has a lower assessment of the job risk both
for the initial period of work and for their
expected duration of work at the firm.
The principal predictions that we explore below stem from the effect of worker
experiences on risk perceptions. For senior
workers on the margin, the wage-workers'
compensation tradeoff should be more neg-
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ative (and less than zero), as indicated by
equation 8. This relationship arises because the higher probability these workers
attach to receiving benefits as a result of
their on-the-job learning about the risks
should be reflected in the preferences captured in quit equations. In addition, the
compensating differential experienced
workers demand for risk will also rise for
any given level of perceived risk, to the
extent that more experienced workers place
less value on future benefits of job experimentation because of their more precise
evaluations of job risk. Experienced workers on the quit margin will also consist disproportionately of workers who have had
or observed adverse job experiences, boosting the required wage-risk tradeoff.
The linkage of the theoretical predictions to the empirical model will be fairly
direct. Wage and workers' compensation
levels are directly observable. We do not
have direct measures of workers' subjective probability of being injured for the
data set that we will use below, but we do
have relatively good data on the fatality
rate for the worker's industry. The underlying assumption is that workers will have
higher risk perceptions and will be more
likely to acquire adverse job information
that will generate quit behavior in industries with high objective measures of risk.
The results in Viscusi (1979a) and Viscusi
and O'Connor (1984) indicate that the job
risk-quit relationship is similar whether
one uses objective industry risk variables
or subjective risk assessments. We use the
objective measure here because our focus
on state differences in workers' compensation requires that we use a large national
data set for which there are no subjective
risk data.
Sample and Empirical Results
Data
The main requirement with respect to
the survey data for the study is that they
include information on wage rates, quit
behavior, the worker's state of residence
(to establish matchups to workers' compensation benefit formulas), and the

worker's state of residence and industry5
(to establish matchups with risk data).
The principal data source we use is the
1981, 1982, and 1983 waves of the
University of Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a
broad longitudinal survey data set that
contains information pertaining to the
characteristics of individuals and their
jobs. These data are matched to information on the risk of an on-the-job fatality
provided by the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
as part of its National Traumatic Occupational Fatality Project (NTOF). Unlike
comparable risk data available from other
sources, the NIOSH data represent a
census of all occupational fatalities, averaged over the years 1981-85. As such,
these data are not subject to the sampling
error that is present in risk survey data.
Furthermore, the NIOSH data vary by
both state and industry, making them
more comparable to the workers' compensation benefit data, which vary primarily
by state. This feature provides a better
matchup than the matchup possible using
other available national survey data, which
vary only by industry. The NIOSH data
yield over 400 distinct observations of job
risk, thus providing one of the most
detailed breakdowns of injury risk cur6
rently available.
The workers' compensation data, which
are described in detail in Viscusi and
Moore (1987), are based on benefits for
temporary total disabilities, the injury
category under which approximately 65%
of total claims fall. Furthermore, in recent
years benefit ceilings for temporary total
5 An exact matchup of benefits and risk levels with
the worker's state of employment, although desirable, is not possible with our data, since sample
members report only their state of residence. For the
majority of cases, however, the state of residence and
the state of employment are the same.
6 The properties of the NIOSH data are explored
in relation to the BLS data in Moore and Viscusi
(1988, 1990).
Since the model is based on perceived changes in
actual risk, the state-industry risk data will not allow
us to distinguish among changes in perceptions,
actual risk changes, and changes in risk preferences.
We assume that the latter two change slowly, if at all.
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disabilities and for permanent total disabilities have become equal in practically
all states. 7 Fatality benefits also usually
equal benefits for the above two categories, although there are some exceptions.
This standardization of benefit ceilings
allows a more representative measure of
ex post accident compensation than was
available in most earlier studies. On the
other hand, it ignores some other important aspects of benefit structure, such as
differences between ceilings for partial
and total disability, waiting periods, and
duration. These differences, although important, cannot be captured in a refined
fashion, and researchers typically resort to
using temporary total disability ceilings or
payments as proxies for each state's
benefit level.
The workers' compensation benefit levels are matched to workers in the PSID by
state. They are then used in conjunction
with information on the worker's weekly
wage, marital status, and family size to
determine the weekly benefit for which
the worker qualifies. The benefit variable
is computed using the formula b = (2/3
weekly wage) x (1 - D) + (benefit
maximum) x D, where D = 1 if the
worker qualifies for the maximum benefit
level, and 0 otherwise. The variable b is
then divided by the worker's after-tax
weekly wage to construct the wage replacement rate measure that is used in the
empirical analysis."
For purposes of estimation, workers
who report their occupation as farming
are excluded from the sample, since the
agricultural sector is excluded from the
NIOSH data. Also excluded are workers
whose reported hourly wage is below the
statutory minimum wage, non-heads of
7 A detailed exploration of the differences in
disability benefits and their interrelationship is
provided by Burton and Krueger (1986) and
Krueger and Burton (1983). A detailed analysis of
the important permanent partial disability component is provided by Burton (1983). More generally,
see Berkowitz and Burton (1987) for an analysis of
permanent disability.

8 We assume that benefits are computed based on
full-time weekly earnings. This assumption reflects
the law in many states, and the actual work week for
the majority of the sample.

households, blacks, workers who are over
65 years old or are not in the labor force,
and cases with missing data. The sample
that remains consists of 2,571 observations
on 857 workers. The mix of the workers
in the sample follows the expected patterns. Fifteen percent of the sample
members are women (FEMALE), 11% are
single (SINGLE), and the mean number of
dependent children is close to 1 (DEPENDENTS).

The human capital variables include the
standard measures. The workers have an
average of about 13 years of schooling
10 years of experience at
(EDUCATION),
their current firm (TENURE), and 18 years
of job experience overall (EXPERIENCE).
Because of the interrelationships among
the various human capital variables, a
worker age measure is not included in the
analysis. The sample consists primarily of
workers in industries in which job hazards
are likely to be of consequence. In
particular, the sample restrictions we have
imposed yield a sample that is over 30%
unionized (UNION).
The average after-tax real hourly wage
equals approximately $7 in 1982 dollars.
The tax component of wages was calculated using information on marginal tax
rates provided by the PSID sample members. Although most wage equation studies utilize the pre-tax wage for simplicity,
the inclusion of workers' compensation
benefits in the equation increases the
importance of using after-tax wages, since
these benefits have favorable tax status.
Moreover, the extent of one's tax savings
varies with one's tax bracket and state tax
level. Failure to make an adjustment for
taxes would thus distort the tradeoff rate
between wages and workers' compensation, which is a central empirical concern
in this paper.
The death risk measure (RISK), which was
described earlier, implies an average death
risk of 7.6/100,000 for sample members.
This risk level is only slightly different from
the national average NTOF risk measure
of 9/100,000, so the sample is representative of the industry mix captured in the
NTOF data set. The roughly 1/10,000 death
risk level should be viewed as a typical risk
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sample rather than a high-risk sample. We
will use the death risk variable as a proxy
for the overall job risk, since this measure
is available on a state-specific basis, whereas
published nonfatal injury data are not
readily available. 9
The basic workers's compensation variable in Table 1 is the real dollar value of
the state weekly workers' compensation
maximum benefit, WCMAX, which averages
$207. Benefits are computed using information on the worker's state of residence,
martial status, number of dependents, and
the formula given above. We also compute
a benefit variable following Moore and Viscusi (1989), using the maximum benefit
level in each state as a proxy for expected
benefits. Since changes in the maximum
influence the distribution of benefits for
which each worker can potentially qualify,
this variable measures changes in expected
benefits when there is wage rate uncertainty. To control for the fact that increases in the maximum are more highly
valued by workers whose wage places them
at or above the maximum, we estimate the
effect of this variable separately for each
class of worker. The relative sizes of the
estimated effects provide a check on the
plausibility of our results. These results also
provide a check on the robustness of the
results derived using the actual benefit level
in the replacement rate.
As shown in Viscusi and Moore (1987),
workers only value accident insurance at
positive risk levels. Thus, the appropriate
measure of workers' compensation, the
weighted weekly benefit level, involves an
interaction of the death risk and the
benefit level. Insurance benefits are captured by the risk-weighted replacement
rate. The benefit level for which the
worker qualifies is interacted with the risk
variable to create the weighted benefit
measure and then divided by the worker's
after-tax weekly wage to create the
weighted replacement rate variable. This
9 Published single-digit (SIC) injury rates for fatal
and nonfatal injuries exhibit a correlation of about
.70 for 1986, significant at the .10 level. See U.S.
Department of Commerce (1989), Tables 681 and
682.

formulation recognizes the fact that the
value of the benefit varies with the risk
and the fact that workers' compensation
benefits are tax exempt. Use of the
weighted replacement rate variable is
consistent with much of the previous
research on the wage effects of workers'
compensation, although some studies have
entered wages and benefits separately.o
As Table 1 indicates, the average replacement rate for the workers in each
tenure group is 0.70. This rate is slightly
higher than the nominal replacement rate
of 0.66 used by most states. Two competing influences lead to this divergence.
Since our replacement rate is computed
on an after-tax basis, it will tend to be
higher than the before-tax nominal rate of
0.66. On the other hand, since many
workers' wages put them above the maximum, the observed replacement rate will
tend to be lower. The net effect is to yield
a rate slightly above the state-mandated
nominal rate.
Empirical Results
The empirical tests of the worker
learning hypothesis compare the wagebenefit and wage-risk tradeoffs estimated
in quit equations across two tenure
groups-workers with at least three years
of tenure, and those with less than three
years. We focus on the quit equation
rather than a wage equation because the
primary matter of interest is how the
wage-risk and wage-benefit preferences of
different groups of workers are altered,
not how market contracts respond. The
cutoff point at three years of tenure is the
division used in Kahn's (1987) analysis of
the preferences of marginal workers.
Furthermore, restricting the newly hired
worker sample to two years of tenure or
less, as in Viscusi (1980c), yielded very
small samples.
Estimates of the parameters of the quit
equations for the senior worker group
provide information on the behavior of
senior workers on the margin, whereas
estimates of the parameters of the quit
10See Worral and Butler (1985).
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sample Characteristics.
Mean (Standard Deviation)

Variable
Name

Variable Definition

Tenure > 3

Tenure < 3

EDUCATION

Years of education

FEMALE

I if worker is female, 0 otherwise

12.93
(2.61)
0.11
(0.31)
0.07
(0.26)
1.05
(1.13)
0.09
(0.28)
21.17
(12.15)
0.34
(0.48)
7.11
(2.33)
7.54
(9.81)
210.81
(69.89)
0.70
(0.20)
0.74
(0.44)
0.08
(0.27)
0.14
(0.34)
0.03
2007

13.23
(2.35)
0.21
(0.41)
0.05
(0.22)
0.97
(1.09)
0.20
(0.40)
13.61
(10.08)
0.23
(0.42)
6.31
(2.45)
8.43
(9.50)
195.35
(65.50)
0.70
(0.18)
0.66
(0.47)
0.15
(0.36)
0.22
(0.42)
0.10
564

DEPENDENTS

1 if worker reports the presence of a health impairment
that limits the amount of work he can do, 0 otherwise
Number of dependent children

SINGLE

1 if worker has never been married, 0 otherwise

EXPERIENCE

Years worked for pay since age 16

UNION STATUS

STRONG QUIT

I if worker's job is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, 0 otherwise
Worker's after-tax hourly wage in 1982 dollars
(GNP deflator)
NTOF fatality rate variable: number of fatalities per
100,000 workers, by state and one-digit (SIC) industry
Maximum benefit level for temporary disability in the
worker's state
Portion of weekly after-tax wage replaced by workers'
compensation
1 if 2/3 of worker's weekly wage exceeds WCMAX, 0
otherwise
1 if worker is looking very hard for a new job,

INTENTIONS

0 OTHERWISE

WEAK QUIT
INTENTIONS

1 if worker is looking at least somewhat hard for a
new job, 0 otherwise
1 if worker changed jobs in the past year, 0 otherwise

HEALTH
LIMITATION

WAGE

RISK
WCMAX
REPLACEMENT
RATE

d

ACTUAL QUITS
SAMPLE SIZE

equations for the junior worker group
provide information on the preferences of
the newly hired worker. Our principal
hypothesis is that the wage-benefit tradeoffs for the newly hired worker group will
be less negative than those of the marginal
senior worker group, which will include
many workers who have acquired unfavorable information about risks on the job.
We expect the risk effect to be larger in
the senior worker group for the same
reason. The self-selection of workers with
more extensive learning and more precise
risk perceptions into the junior worker
group will tend to work against our
principal hypotheses.
The quit equations are estimated using
three measures of quit behavior. Table 1
defines these variables. If a worker an-

swers "yes" to a question asking whether
he is considering looking for a new job,
the weak quit intention variable equals
one; if "no," it equals zero. A similarly
constructed measure of strong quit intentions equals one if the worker reports that
he is seriously considering a new job and
zero otherwise. Finally, the actual quit
variable equals one if the worker quit
during the year and zero otherwise. This
variable pertains only to the 1981 and
1982 data. The quit variables reflect
aggregate quit behavior fairly closely, as
the average quit rate in manufacturing
industries equaled about 1.5% per month
in the late 1970s.I The average value of
the weak quit intention variable of 14%, or
II

See U.S. Department of Labor (1977).
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1.2% per month, roughly equals the
observed rate. The actual quit rate in our
sample, 4.5% per year, is lower than the
aggregate manufacturing rate, as expected, given the broader mix of industries represented in our sample.
The quit equations estimated are of the
form
(13)

Quiti = [1 + exp - (o'Xi
+ 4iqWagei

+ 'YqRiski
+ 8qWeighted
Replacement Ratei)]-1
+

Eiq.

Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable in these equations and the presence of the endogenous wage and replacement rate variables on the right-hand side
of equation 13, nonlinear two stage least
squares is used to estimate the parameters
of the model. 12 As shown by Amemiya
(1985), these estimates are both consistent
and asymptotically normal. Instrumental
variables include all of the exogenous explanatory variables in the quit equations and
3
state dummy variables.'
Higher worker wages should reduce
quitting by increasing the attractiveness of
the worker's current job. Quit rates should
increase with risk levels if there are
learning-induced quits, and higher workers' compensation benefits should diminish quitting. The coefficients of interest
are ( q, -yq, and 8q, which we will use to
calculate the wage-workers' compensation

and wage-risk tradeoffs implied by workers' quit behavior.
Table 2 presents estimates of equation
13, using the actual quit variable, for
workers in each tenure group. The actual
quit variable provides a strong measure of
the job satisfaction of workers, since
workers are less likely to quit than to
merely seek a new job. This measure
should consequently reflect most strongly
the role of worker learning in affecting
the wage-risk and the wage-workers'
compensation tradeoffs.
The Table 2 results indicate that wages
and job risk characteristics are the most
important determinants of workers' quit
behavior. For workers with more than
three years of tenure, increases in the
wage exert significant downward pressure
Table 2. Determinants of Quits: 857 Workers,

1981-1983.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Independent
Variable'
EDUCATION

FEMALE

HEALTH LIMITATION

DEPENDENTS

SINGLE

EXPERIENCE

UNION STATUS

In (Weekly Wage)
12

The SAS procedure SYSNLIN, with the Gauss-

Newton Minimization method, is used to estimate the
model.
13 We experimented with the use of age, experience, and tenure variables as instruments. Since
these variables are important predictors of the wage,
they would serve as useful instruments if they were
independent of the error'term E . When experience
and tenure variables are added to he vector of
instruments, there is no change in point estimates of
the coefficients. The estimated standard errors are
larger when the age variable is used in the weak quit
equation. The main results, particularly those in the
actual quit equation, are unaffected. We report
results using the age, experience, and tenure
variables as instruments.

RISK

WEIGHTED REPLACEMENT
RATE
CONSTANT

Tenure >- 3

Tenure :- 3

0.366**
(0.167)
-0.832
(0.795)
0.408
(0.641)
0.418**
(0.227)
0.534
(0.671)
-0.038*
(0.029)
-0.050
(0.568)
-4.111***
(1.430)
0.590***
(0.215)
- 1.673***
(0.659)
18.029
(7.098)

-0.525***
(0.211)
-0.549
(0.659)
-0.591
(1.632)
-0.306
(0.293)
0.398
(0.670)
-0.073*
(0.046)
-0.361
(0.557)
3.076**
(1.472)
-0.028
(0.144)
-0.141
(0.251)
- 12.826
(6.472)

Sources: Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1981, 1982, 1983; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health data for 1981-85.
Also included as explanatory variables are a
Southeast regional dummy variable, a city size
variable, and a year dummy variable.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level: ** at the
.05 level; * at the .01 level (one-tailed tests).
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on quits. Similarly, increases in workers'
compensation benefits (as captured by the
weighted replacement variable) decrease
quits by workers who have been on the job
for three years or more. Furthermore,
among senior workers, increases in the
risk level have a significant positive effect
on quit behavior, as on-the-job experience
makes workers more aware of adverse
working conditions and also increases the
precision of their estimates of the probability of a job-related injury or health
problem. This risk effect is the same as
that found by Viscusi (1979a). The wage
effect, too, mirrors the earnings effect in
Viscusi's quit intention equation. The
additional effect shown by the workers'
compensation variable provides further
support for the model of rational worker
learning: as workers perceive their jobs to
be more dangerous, workers' compensation benefits become more valuable to
them and serve to dampen the influence
of risk on turnover by mitigating the
financial losses associated with an accident.
The remaining variables in the quit
equation measure the effect of the worker's characteristics on quits, holding constant the wage, the job risk, and the
weighted replacement rate. In most cases,
the signs of these variables are theoretically indeterminate. Significant effects are
found, however, for education, number of
dependents, and work experience in the
more senior worker group.
The equation for workers with less than
three years of tenure indicates that
roughly the same control variables exert a
significant effect on worker quits as in the
senior group. In one case, however, the
effect is opposite that for the older group:
education increases quits by the older
workers but decreases quits by younger
workers. This result could reflect the net
effects of a number of influences. Educational attainment may affect one's prospects for external mobility in a manner
that varies with the extent of one's
job-specific experience. Education may
also complement specific training, which is
accumulated in the early years of a job.
This complementarity would tend to reduce quits initially. The negative educa-

tion effect for junior workers could also
reflect firms' greater commitment to preserving the match for more educated
young workers. As workers acquire more
work history, the job-signaling information content of the education becomes less
important to the employer. For senior
workers, greater education increases job
mobility, with little connection between a
worker's education and the firm's desire to
retain the worker.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, none of the job risk characteristics
variables are statistically significant in the
equation for junior workers, because their
perceptions of risks and, therefore, their
valuations of risk insurance are very
imprecise. Indeed, in the early stages of
the employment process, workers have
been shown by Viscusi (1979a) to show a
systematic preference for jobs with characteristics that are only poorly understood.
This preference is reflected in the lack of
an effect of the risk variable and the
weighted replacement rate variable.
The wage variable exerts a significant
positive effect for the junior workers. This
unexpected result could be due to a
number of influences. The most obvious
explanation, that the causality between
quits and wages runs in the opposite
direction, not only would have to survive
the instrumentation but also would have
to provide an explanation of why reverse
causality only matters for junior workers.
Alternatively, wages could be acting as a
proxy for skills that junior workers are
offering to different employers. These
skills could be observable to both the
worker and the firm, unlike those in the
signaling context discussed above, but not
captured in our data. More able workers
and firms would be willing to invest more
in the job matching process. Furthermore,
in the job matching model of Mortensen
(1978), wages are not necessarily negatively related to turnover. Rather, the
wage acts as a proxy for the match-specific
capital; and inclusion of these components
of the capital as regressors will eliminate
any wage effect. Finally, it could be the
case that the expected search costs are
lower for high-wage young workers than
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for those bound by minimum wages, who
face large queues for available jobs, thus
making the high-wage junior workers
more likely to quit.
For the actual quit equation, we thus
have reasonably precise estimates of the
parameters used to calculate the wageworkers' compensation tradeoff for workers with more than three years of tenure.
The wage, risk, and workers' compensation variables are all significant at the 1%
level or lower for these workers. As
expected, variation in benefits does not

cause any significant variation in quits for
new hires.
Further support for the learning model is
found by comparing the effects of RISK on
quit intentions and on actual quits across
tenure groups for alternative specifications.
Table 3 presents the risk and workers' compensation effects for all three measures of
quit behavior, as well as the effects of different measures of the wage variable (the
after-tax weekly wage is always used in the
replacement rate variable). In addition to
the actual quit variable, we also estimate

Table 3. Wage-Risk and Wage-Replacement Rate Tradeoffs: Summary of Coefficient Estimates.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Dependent
Variable
Actual Quits
(i)

In (Weekly Wage)
TENURE -> 3
TENURE <

(ii)

3

Weekly Wage
TENURE > 3
TENURE <

3

Weak Quit Intentions
(i)
In (Weekly Wage)
TENURE > 3
TENURE <

(ii)

3

Weekly Wage
"
3

TENURE

TENURE <

3

Strong Quit Intentions
(i)
In (Weekly Wage)
TENURE m 3
TENURE <

(ii)

3

Weekly Wage
"
TENURE
3

Wage

Risk

Weighted
Replacement Rate

-4.111***
(1.430)
3.076**
(1.472)

0.590***
(0.215)
-0.028
(0.144)

- 1.673***
(0.659)
-0.141
(0.251)

-0.012**
(0.005)
0.004**
(0.002)

0.650***
(0.245)
0.003
(0.115)

- 1.819***
(0.690)
-0.130
(0.221)

- 2.246***
(0.573)
0.458
(0.68 1)

0.077*
(0.051)
-0.031
(0.057)

-0.122*
(0.083)
0.042
(0.076)

- 0.005**
(0.002)
0.04E-3
(1.58E-3)

0.072*
(0.048)
-0.009
(0.053)

- 0. 115*

- 2.104**
(0.646)
3.077**
(1.472)

0.085**
(0.052)
-0.028
(0.144)

-0.111**
(0.087)
-0.141
(0.251)

- 0.005**
(0.002)

0.087**
(0.050)

-0.112*
(0.083)

TENURE "< 3

(0.079)
0.014
(0.072)

a

Sources: See notes to Table 2.
a Estimates would not converge.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level;

** at the .05 level;

*** at the .01 level (one-tailed tests).
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equation 13 using measures of weak and
strong quit intentions as dependent variables. As the results in Table 3 indicate, the
findings in Table 2 are quite robust over the
different specifications. Both higher wages
and increases in the weighted replacement
rate significantly reduce quits and quit intentions for workers in the more senior tenure groups. For workers with less than three
years' tenure, actual quits are positively and
significantly related (as before) to wages; neither risk nor the weighted replacement rate
shows any systematic effects on quits or quit
tendencies for these workers.
To evaluate the robustness of our
results, particularly with respect to the
specifications used in some of our previous work, we also estimated the quit
equations using the benefit measure of
Moore and Viscusi (1989), which analyzed
the effects of workers' compensation on
job fatalities. As noted above, the numerator of the weighted replacement rate
variable in this case uses the maximum
benefit payment for the worker's state as
the numerator of the replacement rate.
To account for the fact that changes in the
benefit maximum will be more highly
valued by the workers whose wage exceeds
the maximum, we estimate 8q separately
for each worker group (that is, for those
workers whose current weekly wage places
them above or below the maximum). This
comparison is accomplished using the
dummy variable D, defined earlier. The
variable D is also treated as endogenous in
estimating the quit equations. An additional test of the plausibility of our results
is the prediction that the estimate of 8q,
given D = 1, should be more negative
than its estimated value when D = 0.
Use of the benefit maximum as the
numerator could introduce some error
into our measure of the replacement rate,
since it overstates the replacement rate for
workers whose wages are low enough to
place them below the maximum in their
state. In Moore and Viscusi (1989), however, we argue that changes in the
maximum will be valued by all workers
because weekly wages are not known with
certainty a priori. An increase in the
maximum will therefore increase expected

benefits for all workers, with the extent of
the increase being felt most strongly by
workers whose wage places them above
the maximum. Finally, since benefit ceilings are one of the primary policy instruments available for altering benefit levels,
direct estimates of the effect of changes in
the maximum are most relevant for policy
purposes. 14
The results of this estimation, summarized in Table 4, essentially replicate those
reported in Table 3 in terms of sign and
statistical significance. The quit behavior of
workers with more than three years of tenure is systematically related to both the risk
level and the risk-weighted value of workers' compensation benefits. Increases in risk
lead to significantly more quits, and to increased intentions to quit. This effect is once
again reduced by insurance for financial
losses and medical costs associated with an
injury that are embodied in the workers'
compensation program. Quits and quit intentions of workers with less than three
years' tenure, on the other hand, are not
significantly related to either of these forces.
A further test of the plausibility of the
model compares the coefficients on the
weighted replacement rate variables for
workers whose wage places them above or
below the benefit maximum. If workers
are uncertain about their future wage,
then each worker will attach some likelihood to the possibility that the wage at the
time of an injury will exceed the benefit
maximum. Workers whose wages currently exceed the maximum will attach a
greater probability to this outcome and
will, therefore, value changes in the
benefit maximum more highly. As a
consequence, the estimated replacement
rate effects should be more negative for
workers whose current weekly wage exceeds the benefit maximum.
Our results support this prediction for the
14 A further reason for use of the maximum
is that
it allows direct comparisons with our other published
studies on this subject (Moore and Viscusi 1990). An
earlier version of this paper used the benefit maxima
rather than the replacement rate as the benefit
measure. The signs, significance levels, and magnitudes of the key coefficients in the wage and quit
equations mirror those reported here.
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Table 4. Wage-Risk and Wage-Benefit Tradeoffs: Summary of Coefficient Estimates
Using Alternative Benefit Variable.

(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Independent Variable
Weighted
Replacement Rate

Dependent
Variable

In (Wage)

Weak Quit Intentions
- 3

- 2.022***

TENURE

TENURE <

3

x d

Risk
0.266**
(0.115)

(0.680)
1.193
(1.025)

-0.062

0.579**

x (l-d)

(0.290)

-0.205**
(0.101)

0.091

-0.101

(0.124)

(0.094)

- 1.028**
(0.464)

-0.290**

(0.159)

0.042

-0.129

-0.026

(0.087)

Strong Quit Intentions
TENURE

a 3

0.411***

- 2.200***
(0.750)

TENURE

< 3

-0.422

(0.176)

(0.904)

(0.086)

--0.070**
(0.042)

(2.32E-3)

(0.139)
(0.072)

a

Actual Quits
TENURE
TENURE

-> 3
< 3

5.73E-3***
- 2.28E-3

0.151

(5.58E-3)

(0.106)

Sources: See notes to Table 2.
Not significantly different from adjacent estimates.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level: ** at the .05 level;

-8.45E-3***

a

(2.94E-3)

- 3.09E-3

a

(6.82E-3)

a

senior worker group in two of three cases.
For both quit intention variables, the
weighted replacement rate effects are negative and significant whether the wage exceeds or falls below the maximum. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient is always
more negative than the corresponding estimate for low-wage workers. In the actual
quit equation estimated for more senior
workers, the two estimates are not significandy different from each other. When restricted to equality, they are negative and
significant. Consistent with our principal hypothesis, the estimated wage-benefit tradeoffs are less negative for the junior worker
group. This pattern obtains for both lowand high-wage workers, regardless of the
quit variable used. These results, and the
general robustness of the results in Table 3,
indicate that the hypothesis withstands a variety of changes in specification.

for senior workers on the quit-no quit
margin than for the new hires. In an
important sense, the detailed calculations
are unnecessary, since none of the tradeoffs for the junior worker groups are
based on coefficients that differ significantly from zero. Nonetheless, point estimates will indicate whether the hypotheses
hold for the data in our sample. Using the
results in Table 3, the tradeoffs can be
calculated directly.
In the quit equations, the wage-benefit
tradeoff is computed as the negative of the
ratio of the partial effect of a dollar
increase in workers' compensation benefits on quit intentions, -(aQ/ab), to the
effect of a dollar increase in wages on
the same dependent variables, (aQ/Ow),
where b and w denote the benefit and the
wage:
(14)

Tests of Worker Learning-Wage
Benefit Tradeoffs
The model predicts that the wagebenefit tradeoff should be more negative

*** at the .01 level (one-tailed tests).

aw _ -aQab
ab
aQ/aw

To evaluate this expression, the quit
equation given by equation 13 above is
rewritten as
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(15)

Q=

[1 + exp - ('x + 4 qwH
8
+ iqp +
qpR)],

where w denotes the wage, p the death
risk, H the hours worked per week, and
R the replacement rate. 15 Letting P(Q)
denote the right-hand side of this equation, the partial effect of an increase in
the wage on quits and quit intentions
equals
(16)-

Q=

Ow

P(Q) (1-P(Q)) ()q.H

+ s

Differentiating this expression with respect to the wage then yields the expression
OD

[W[WCMAX - (2/3)wH] -aW -

DWcMAX]

The first term in this expression will
always equal zero, since variation in the
weekly wage will affect the variable D only
when the worker just qualifies for the
maximum, at which point the first part of
this term equals zero. Inserting the nonzero portion of equation 18 into equation
16 yields the expression

OQ
ow
P(Q) (1- P(Q)

Similar calculations yield the expression
for the wage-risk tradeoff

8p

-

Y 70 i 0 R

41,qH -

2

8qpDWCMAX/(W ( 1 -

t)H)"

Table 5 summarizes the median wagebenefit tradeoffs, and also the median wagerisk tradeoffs computed using the coefficient estimates in Table 3. We report medians
to control for outlier problems associates with
computing the sample means.
In every case considered, as predicted
by the theory, the median wage-benefit
tradeoffs are more negative (and less than
zero) for the senior workers. For the
median senior worker in the quit equation, the wage-benefit tradeoff equals
Table 5. Wage-Benefit and Wage-Risk
Tradeoffs: Median Estimated Effects.

W2(1 - t)H

(19)

ab

The wage-benefit tradeoff then equals the
negative of the ratio of equation 20 to
equation 19,
- 8,p(w(1- t)H)
(21)WO2)w=
2
ab 4)qH - 8qpDWCMAX(W (1 - t)H)"

(22)

OR
Ow

L- = P(Q) (1-P(Q)) (qP/W(1 -t)1).

aR).

The replacement rate can be written as a
function of the weekly wage, the dummy
variable D, the benefit ceiling WCMAX, and
the tax rate:
(2/3) (1 - D)wH + DWcMAX
w(1 t)H

(18)

(20)

- - 2 8QpDWCMAX
W

(l - t)H

Again using equation 15 and the definition of the replacement rate R = b/
w(1 - t)H, the effect of an increase in
benefits on quit behavior equals

15 Note that we now use p to denote the risk of an
injury, whereas the theoretical model used p to
denote the probability of no injury.

Quit and
Wage Variables

TENURE

TENURE

3 years

<
3 years

Wage-Benefit Tradeoffs
Actual Quits
In (Weekly Wage) (x 10 - 3)
-3.5
Weekly Wage (x 10- 3 )
-3.6
Weak Quit Intentions
In (Weekly Wage) (X 10 - 3)
-6.6
Weekly Wage (x 10 - 3)
-7.6
Strong Quit Intentions
In (Weekly Wage) (x 10- 3)
-6.4
Weekly Wage (x 10 - 3)
-7.4
Wage-Risk Tradeoffs
Actual Quits
In (Weekly Wage) (x 10 - 2)
22.5
Weekly Wage (x 10 - 2)
12.2
Weak Quit Intentions
In (Weekly Wage) (x 10 - 2)
-4.4
Weekly Wage (x 10-2)
-6.3
Strong Quit Intentions
In (Weekly Wage) (X 10 - 2)
0.4
Weekly Wage (x 10 - 2)
1.7
Sources: See notes to Table 2.
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5.3
12.0
-0.2
48.9
5.3
a

25.5
37.9
-2.6
-20.8
25.5
a
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-. 35 cents per dollar of benefits, compared to a positive wage-benefit tradeoff
of .53 cents per dollar of benefits for
junior workers. In addition to the absolute
differences observed in the quit equations
and the similar differences in the weak
and strong quit intentions equations, the
wage-benefit tradeoffs for the senior
workers are all based on coefficient estimates that are statistically significant,
whereas those tradeoffs estimated for the
junior workers represent a combination of
coefficients, none of which are significantly different from zero. Finally, the
wage-benefit tradeoffs for the senior
workers are quite stable across all six
equations. Thus, in addition to the observed differences in the tradeoffs between the more and less senior workers,
the tradeoffs estimated for the senior
worker group are also much more precise.
We conclude that the predictions of the
model are supported and appear to be
robust across a variety of specifications of
the dependent variables.
The wage-risk tradeoff results summarized in the second panel of Table 5 are
less consistent with the learning model in
which experienced workers have higher
risk assessments. If workers were fully
informed and all workers' perceptions
were identical, the wage-risk tradeoffs
would not vary by tenure group. In almost
every instance, however, there is evidence
of a larger positive wage premium for risk
in the case of less experienced workers on
the quit margin. Once again, however, few
of the coefficient estimates in the junior
worker group are significant, so this result
is not particularly troublesome. Moreover,
since the risk variable enters the equation
directly and through the expected replacement rate variable, it may be difficult to
reliably estimate the effects of these
correlated variables.
Due to the insignificance of the coefficients in the junior worker equations, the
most important information to be gained
from these calculations lies not in the comparison of effects, but in the policy implications of the estimates for the senior worker
group. Most important, the results support
the view of the labor market as an efficient

sorter of workers that compensates workers
for exposure to risk and subsidizes injury
insurance through wage reductions.
We can also use these results to estimate
whether benefit levels are adequate, using
the procedure in Viscusi and Moore
(1987). In this framework, the observed
tradeoff will equal the ratio -p(1 -p),
where p is the probability of an accident.
For the fatality risk data, this ratio equals
about - 1/10,000. The estimated tradeoffs
between benefits and wages in the actual
quit equations, when both wages and
benefits are put on a weekly basis, are6
many times greater than this figure.'
Thus, since the observed tradeoff exceeds
the optimal tradeoff, it would appear that
benefit levels are too low. Since we do not
include a nonfatal risk variable in the quit
equations, however, the observed rate of
tradeoff might reflect instead the rate that
is optimal for risks of all types of injuries,
which would be much closer to the
observed tradeoff.
The same coefficients can also be used to
calculate the value of life and the degree of
risk aversion implied by our estimates. Using the estimates in the strong quit equation, the estimated value of life implied by
the estimates ranges between 1 and 4.25
million dollars. 17 This range is lower than
the estimates in the wage equations estimated by Moore and Viscusi (1989) using
the NTOF data, and is similar to many estimates found in the literature. Since the
wage-risk tradeoffs are not as stable as the
wage-benefit tradeoffs across equations
within the senior worker group, the valueof-life calculations are not as meaningful as
the calculations for assessing benefit optimality.
Finally, since we know that workers will
give up approximately .004 dollars in
weekly wages for a one-dollar increase in
benefits, we can compute the degree of
16 The estimated tradeoff of .0035 dollars per
hour multiplied by 40 hours yields a weekly wage
decrease of 14 cents corresponding to a $1 benefit
increase.
17 For example, the wage-risk tradeoff of .017,
when multiplied by 2,000 hours, an inflation factor
of 1.25, and 100,000 (the risk scaling factor that
yields one statistical life), equals 4.25 million.
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risk aversion exhibited by the workers in
our sample. If benefits were to rise by two
dollars per week, wages would fall by
about $.01, for an annual decline of 50
cents. The discounted expected value of
this two-dollar benefit increase, at an
annual risk level of 1/10,000 and with 52
weeks per year and a real discount rate of
5%, is 21 cents. Thus, the implication is
that workers are risk averse, and are
willing to sacrifice one dollar of wages for
about 42 cents in expected insurance
benefits.
Conclusion
The results in this paper and in other
recent studies suggest that compensating
differentials for risk should be viewed as a
broader issue than the standard wage-risk
tradeoff literature implies. Wages and
workers' compensation serve as complementary compensation mechanisms, with
wages providing ex ante risk compensa-

tion and workers' compensation providing
ex post earnings replacement. Each of
these earnings components reduces
worker quitting, and workers accept a
lower wage in return for higher workers'
compensation benefits. This tradeoff reflects worker preferences for different
forms of risk compensation.
The results presented here utilize these
wage and quit relationships to explore the
differences in the wage-workers' compensation tradeoff for workers on the quit
margin. Estimated tradeoffs indicate that
workers on the quit margin place a much
higher relative value on workers' compensation than do new hires. Moreover,
greater job risks lead to significant increases in quits and quit intentions for
workers on the quit margin but have no
effect on the quit behavior of junior
workers. These findings are consistent
with a model in which worker quits are
induced in part by learning about risks on
the job.
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